



World Food Programme

SAVING
LIVES
CHANGING
LIVES

NIGER : PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ON THE IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND SANCTIONS ON FOOD SECURITY AND MARKETS

12 AUGUST 2023

KEY MESSAGES

1) Niger was already facing a food security crisis before the political crisis and sanctions

- **3.3 million people (13% of the population) were already severely food insecure (CH phases 3 and 4)** during the ongoing lean season (June- August 2023) – the second highest figure since the inception of the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) in Niger in 2012 – due to insecurity, price inflation, and lingering impacts of the 2021 drought. Niger also faces a nutrition crisis, with a Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate of 12,2% according to the latest SMART survey (November 2022) - above the WHO's 10% alert threshold.
- In 2023, **an additional 7.3 million people (28% of the population) is estimated to be moderately food insecure (CH phase 2)**, and could fall into severe food insecurity (CH phases 3 and 4) if faced with significant shocks (such as significant price hikes or loss of livelihoods, which are expected due to the current crisis).
- **Food markets were also extremely strained**, due to skyrocketing inflation in neighbouring Nigeria (Niger's main source country for food imports) caused by the suspension of fuel subsidies in June, India's ban on rice exports announced July 20th , and the end of the Black Sea Grain initiative – which together caused Niger to announce a ban on millet and rice exports on July 21st .
- **Worrying perspectives for the ongoing agro-pastoral season due to severe localized droughts:** significant pasture deficits and reported livestock deaths in Tahoua and Maradi regions; major concerns for the upcoming September/October harvest in Tillabéri and Dosso.

2) The political crisis and sanctions will exacerbate food insecurity in Niger in 7 ways:

1. Suspension of trade/ border closures with Nigeria and Benin will **reduce supply and increase prices of imported cereals and other food commodities** (especially rice, maize and vegetable oil). This will likely also have a knock-on effect on price of locally produced cereals such as millet and sorghum, as demand shifts away from imported cereals towards these cereals. **In the week following the announcement of sanctions, the national average price of rice increased by 17%.**
2. Financial sanctions will **reduce remittance inflows**, which are particularly important for poor households.
3. Suspension of trade will negatively affect the **livelihoods of Nigeriens produce farmers (especially tomatoes and onions) and livestock herders who rely on exports to Nigeria**, as well as people on both sides of the border who work in **trade and transport**.
4. Potential departure/ downscaling of international military forces, embassies, foreign companies (uranium, telecoms, banking etc) will lead to **significant job losses (employees, hospitality/ tourism workers, domestic workers, guards etc)**. In the longer term, electricity shortage and trade restrictions will reduce **GDP growth**, leading to an increase in poverty and food insecurity (**in Mali, the 2022 sanctions** which lasted 6 months, together with the Ukraine crisis, are estimated to have **cost 3% of GDP growth**).
5. Banking freezes and suspension of foreign assistance will **reduce government budget – impacting civil servant salaries as well as the government’s humanitarian response capacity** (including ongoing lean season food distributions and subsidized sales of cereals and animal feed).
6. Border closures and suspension of some donor funding will directly impact **WFP and partners’ humanitarian assistance**, by hindering **importation of food and specialized products for malnutrition treatment and prevention**.

ACRONYMS

English	French
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)	CEDEAO (Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest)
BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States)	BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest)
WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union)	UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine)
EBID (ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development)	BIDC (Banque d'Investissement et de Développement de la Communauté)
WADB (West African Development Bank)	BOAD (Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement)

CONTEXT




ECOWAS SANCTIONS (ANNOUNCED ON 30 JULY 2023)

Note: Burkina Faso and Mali have announced they will not apply sanctions.

- 1) Suspension of all commercial transactions (trade in goods and services) between Niger and ECOWAS countries. *This is stricter than the ECOWAS sanctions on Mali and Burkina Faso in 2022, which gave exemptions to electricity, oil products, pharmaceuticals, and food products.***
 - Nigeria, which supplies 70% of Niger's electricity, has already cut off electricity supply to Niger, leading to major power cuts. Construction of the Kandadji hydroelectric power-station, which was meant to open in 2025 and increase Niger's electricity supply by 50%, has also been halted as of Aug 10th.
- 2) Closure of land and air borders between ECOWAS countries and Niger, which will also affect trade with non-ECOWAS countries.**
- 3) Suspension of financial transactions between Niger and ECOWAS countries.**
- 4) Freeze of Government public assets, state and parastatal enterprises held in the BCEAO and in commercial banks in the WAEMU region.**
- 5) Suspension of all regional financial assistance - mainly from the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) and West African Development Bank (BOAD).**
- 6) Other non-ECOWAS measures: Suspension of military, development and humanitarian assistance to the Niger government from France, Germany, the EU and other countries.**

Status of Niger's land borders with neighboring countries
Situation as of August 08, 2023



SAVING LIVES
CHANGING LIVES



World Food Programme

Date Created: 10 août 2023 - Contact: djibril.hassan@wfp.org - Website: www.wfp.org - Prepared by: RAM Niger-Map Reference: 2023_Niger frontières avec CEDEAO

Data sources: WFP offices; WFP - Boundaries: COD - Statut des frontières: situation à la date du 04 août 2023

The designations employed and the presentation of material in the map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory, city or sea, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.


© World Food Programme 2023

CONTEXT OVERVIEW– NIGER BEFORE THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND SANCTIONS

- Landlocked country with a population of 26 million people, of which 42% live in extreme poverty (on less than USD 1.90/ day). Third lowest Human Development Index (HDI) in the world in 2021– ranked 189th out of 191 countries, behind Chad and South Sudan.
- Already facing a food security and price crisis
- Growing insecurity in border areas with Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Chad
- Highly dependant on imports, which represent 19% of GDP in 2022; food accounted for over 30% of imports; around 20% of cereals are imported (mostly rice and maize from Nigeria and Benin); international imports mostly via Benin and Togo ports
- Government highly dependant on foreign assistance:
 - Grants or loans from the World Bank, IMF and other donors represented close to 9% of GDP in 2022
 - 40% of the country's 2023 budget was expected to come from external sources

FOOD SECURITY TRENDS

Niger: number of severely food insecure people during the June-August lean season period (people in Cadre Harmonisé phase 3 and 4)




- The food security situation in Niger has been **deteriorating significantly over the past 5 years**, reaching a peak of 4.4 million people (18% of the population) facing severe food insecurity in 2022. Poor households, who have been facing shocks year after year – COVID19, the global food price crisis, the 2021 drought, and now political crisis and sanctions – have exhausted traditional coping mechanisms and are facing increasingly dire prospects.
- In 2023, **3.3 million people** (13% of the total population) were estimated to be **severely food insecure** (IPC/ CH phase 3 and 4) during the June-August lean season (CH March 2023 analysis, reflecting the situation before the political crisis and sanctions). This is the second highest figure since the inception of the CH in Niger in 2012.
- In 2023, an **additional 7.3 million people** (28% of the population) is estimated to be moderately food insecure (IPC phase 2), and **could fall into severe food insecurity if faced with significant shocks** (such as significant price hikes or loss of livelihoods, which are expected due to the current crisis).
- The 2022 harvest was relatively good, with a local cereal deficit of 3%. However, **households are still to this day coping with the impacts of the 2021 drought and failed harvest**, which led to a cereal deficit of 40% and forced households to sell productive assets and reduce already inadequate food consumption.
- In addition, there are major concerns over current pastoral conditions and the upcoming harvest (September/ October 2023)– see next slide.

MALNUTRITION TRENDS

- Niger faces a worrying nutrition situation, with the November 2022 SMART survey showing a **global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate of 12.2%** and a **rate of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) of 2.4%**.
- While acute malnutrition rates have declined slightly since 2018, they have remained consistently above WHO's alert threshold (10% for GAM, 2% for SAM). The sharpest decline was seen between 2018 and 2019 – and since then rates have more or less plateaued. **Chronic malnutrition rates actually rose** from 44% in 2021 to 47% in 2022 – well above WHO's "very high" threshold (30%).
- Given Niger's fast-growing population (roughly 1 million additional people every year), this means the absolute number of malnourished children is increasing every year.
- Any further shocks – including reduced household access to nutritious foods due to market unavailability or higher prices – will exacerbate this.


Niger - malnutrition trends 2018-22 (among children aged 6-59 months)



MAJOR CONCERNS OVER THE UPCOMING 2023/24 AGRO-PASTORAL SEASON


CEREAL PRODUCTION

- **Severe rainfall deficits** have already been recorded in critical parts of the country, in particular in the conflict-affected and already highly food insecure regions of **Tillabéri and Tahoua, as well as Dosso.**
- As of July 15th, these areas witnessed **dry spells of over 20 days**, causing the **loss of seedlings** in 295 villages in Tahoua and 66 villages in the Tillabéri.
- This raises serious concerns over the upcoming 2023 harvest in those areas – especially current sanctions which will limit imports should the country face a severe cereal deficit.
- There are also **serious concerns about potential flooding** in the coming 1-2 months, with forecasts projecting significant rainfall in key population and agricultural areas (Tillabéri, Maradi, southern Tahoua, and Niamey)




PASTORAL CONDITIONS

- Localized drought has also led to major **pasture deficit in key pastoral areas in the regions of Tahoua and Maradi**, causing livestock deaths, distress sales and early/ unusual migration of herders in search of pasture.
- The most affected regions are the departments of Keita and Abalak (Tahoua region) and Bermo (Maradi region).
- This could lead to **conflicts between herders over pasture and water points, as well as between herders and farmers** as animals enter fields before harvest, damaging crops.



INSECURITY IN AND AROUND NIGER




- Intensification of conflicts in areas bordering Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria over the past 12 months.
- Growing concerns over the security situation on the border with Benin
- Close to 40% of Niger’s severely food insecure population (CH phase 3 and 4) is living in hard to reach areas, even though these areas account for only 18% of Niger’s total population
- 20 out of 22 departments classified in CH phase 3 are also classified as being hard to reach (March 2023 CH analysis)

MARKETS AND PRICES

- **Food prices in Niger had been extremely high since mid 2020**, peaking in August 2022; while prices have slightly dropped since then, they remain unusually high. High prices have been caused by a combination of external factors (lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on global food and transport prices, Ukraine crisis, insecurity disrupting internal and cross border trade, drought leading to poor 2021/22 harvest). In June 2023, average national millet prices were 44% higher than in June 2019 (pre-COVID).
- **Sanctions were imposed just as prices in Niger were rising again** due to several factors: the start of the lean season (the June-August period right before the next harvest, when households have exhausted the previous year's food stocks and prices are at their seasonal high); the suspension of fuel subsidies in Nigeria in June which caused food prices across the border to skyrocket (food inflation in Nigeria in June stood at 25%); the suspension of the Black Sea grain initiative and India's subsequent rice export ban, announced on July 20th.


Evolution of millet price from 2018 to July 2023




CEREAL CONSUMPTION

- The main cereals consumed in Niger are **millet, sorghum and maize** (which combined represent 86% of cereals consumed in 2022). These are **primarily produced locally** (96% local production in 2022).
- However, **rice** (and to a lesser extent wheat flour) are **increasingly important in diets, especially in urban areas** – representing **14% of total cereal consumption in 2022**. Both are almost entirely imported from India and China, via Nigeria and Benin – both of which have suspended trade with Niger.

Share of each cereal in total cereal consumption, 2022



Sources of main cereals available in Niger, 2022



CEREAL AVAILABILITY 2022/23 MARKETING YEAR (AS OF JULY 2023)

Source: FAO

	Wheat	Rice	Coarse grains	Total cereals
2022/23 Domestic availability (000 tonnes)	5	102	5 773	5 865
2022 production	5	87	5 773	5 865
Expected stock drawdown	-	15	-	-
2022/23 Utilization (000 tonnes)	74	517	5 943	6 519
Food use	73	484	4 503	5 060
Non-food use	1	31	1 000	1 032
Exports	-	2	-	2
Expected stock buildup	-	-	440	425
2022/23 Import requirements (000 tonnes)	69	415	170	654
Per caput consumption (kg/year)	3	18	172	193
2022/23 Comparison with the previous year and the recent average				
Production (000 tonnes)				
Previous year's production	6	80	3 364	3 450
Previous five years' average production	5	71	5 145	5 221
2022 production compared to average (%)	103	123	112	112
Import requirements (000 tonnes)				
Previous year's imports	66	315	155	536
Previous five years' average imports	69	383	75	527
2022/23 Import requirements compared to average (%)	100	108	225	124

Note: Rice marketing year January/December of second year shown.


Note: coarse grains = millet, sorghum and maize

- Despite a relatively good local harvest in 2022, total cereal import requirements were above average for the 2022/23 marketing year (124% of average requirements)
- Total cereal 2022/23 import requirements (654 000 MT) were also higher than that of 2021/22 (536 000 MT), despite the poor 2021 harvest, and higher than the 5 year average (527 000 MT).
- This could in part be explained by lower starting stock in 2022 due to the poor 2021 harvest; it also suggests that **import requirements are growing steadily, even in years with good harvests** (due to population growth and increasing urban consumption?)
- Given concerns over the upcoming 2023 harvest, it's **likley that import requirements for 2022/23 will be higher or at least on par with last year's.**

REGIONAL TRADE FLOWS

Niger

Projected Trade flow MY 2022/2023



Imports: mainly cereals, primarily from Nigeria and to a lesser extent from Mali, Burkina Faso and Bénin (imports from Bénin have been growing recently)

Exports: mainly cash crops (onions and tomatoes) and livestock, primarily to Nigeria




Data Created: 06 Aug 2023 - Contact: abdoulaye.ndiaye@wfp.org - Website: www.wfp.org - Prepared by: VAM, RBD
 Data sources: WFP offices; WFP - Boundaries; COD - Roads; ©OpenStreetMap Contributors - Populated places: GeoNames, Market - FEWSNET
 The designations employed and the presentation of material in the map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory, city or sea, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
 © World Food Programme 2023

Data Source: FEWS NET

IMPORTS

Share of total import value, by type of goods




- Imports represented about 19% of GDP in 2022
- On average over the past 5 years, **16% of total imports originated from ECOWAS countries** (and the vast majority of imports entered the country *via* ECOWAS countries).
- In 2022, **food accounted for around one quarter of imports** (rice, vegetable oil and sugar) – down from 34% in 2021, due to the increased share of equipment (including military equipment)
- **Cereal import dependency is one of the highest for the Sahel:** the 2018-2020 average stands at 14%, compared to 4% for Mali and Chad and 6% for Burkina Faso.
- **Rice** is the single most important important good in terms of import value, followed by electricity, cars and cigarettes

Source: Niger National institute of statistics

EXPORTS

Share of total export value, by type of goods



- The main exports in terms of value are **mining resources** (hydrocarbon, uranium and gold).
- Although livestock and agricultural products (especially onions and tomatoes) represented only 8% of total export value in 2022, they are a **key source of income and livelihood for smallholder farmers and herders.**
- On average over the past 5 years, ECOWAS countries were the final destination for **51% of total exports** (Mali followed by Nigeria). Other key export destinations are China and France. As with imports, the vast majority of exports, even those going to Asia or Europe, were done *via* ECOWAS countries.

Source: Niger National institute of statistics

IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND SANCTIONS



1

MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS

1. **Food price inflation** (already observed)
2. **Potential food shortages** (medium term), especially imported products such as rice, sugar, vegetable oil.
3. **Contraction of trade and economic activity (border closures and electricity shortages)**, leading to lower **GDP growth and increased poverty** (medium term).
 - In Mali, the 2022 sanctions which lasted 6 months, together with the war in Ukraine, are estimated to have cost 3% of GDP growth.

2

IMPACTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOMES AND FOOD SECURITY

- 1. Reduction of remittance inflows** from migrants living in the ECOWAS space. Total remittances represented ~4% of GDP in 2022 and are a **critical income source for the poorest households**.
 - In 2022 Niger received 534 million USD in remittances, of which 89 million USD (17%) from migrants living in ECOWAS countries.
- Suspension of trade will negatively affect the **livelihoods of Nigeriens farmers and herders who rely on exports of fresh produce and livestock products to Nigeria and Benin**, as well as people on both sides of the border who work in **trade and transport**.
 - Nigeriens onion and tomato farmers and truck drivers are already suffering as products destined for export rot at the closed border. Borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, while open, are less accessible due to insecurity.
- 3. Sanction impacts on transhuman livestock herders who normally migrate between Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Benin in search of pasture is still unclear**, as cross border movements had already reduced significantly over the past few months due to insecurity and taxations on livestock at the borders.
- Import restrictions will **reduce the availability and increase the price of fertilizer and animal feed**, thereby negatively impacting productivity and livelihoods and farmers and pastoralists.
- Potential departure/ downscaling of international military forces, embassies, foreign companies (uranium, telecoms, banking etc) will lead to **significant job losses, especially in urban areas (hospitality/ tourism workers, domestic workers, guards etc)**.
- Government budget deficits due to suspension of international aid could lead to **salary cuts or layoffs for government employees – at both national and decentralized levels**

3

IMPACTS ON HUMANITARIAN FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY PROGRAMMES


- 1. Increase in the number of acutely food insecure people and of malnourished children**, due to aforementioned impacts on livelihoods and food prices – thereby requiring scale up of emergency food and nutrition assistance.
- 2. Reduction in already low government capacities for humanitarian assistance** – including as part of the ongoing lean season response, due to likely government budget deficit.
- 3. Unless humanitarian exceptions are urgently established, disruption to WFP and partners' food security and nutrition programmes**, due to sanction-induced operational constraints, as well as possible funding reductions from donor countries :
 - **In-kind food:** border closures are severely impacting WFP's ability to import food via Nigeria and the Togo/ Benin corridor. Limited scope to shift to local purchases due to availability and risk of adding to inflationary pressure on local markets.
 - **Nutritional products** for treatment and prevention of malnutrition: stocks available in country can cover needs for MAM treatment until September 2023 and needs for SAM treatment until end of 2023. Arrival of further stocks will depend on reopening of borders (some stocks are blocked at the Lomé port and in Bénin)
 - **Cash transfers:** limitations on amounts of cash that can be withdrawn by financial service providers may affect ability to carry out cash transfers at scale in the future (at the moment cash operations are able to proceed).

PRICE TRENDS SINCE THE START OF THE CRISIS

- Prices for all cereals stayed stable in the days following the onset of the political crisis (week of 24-30 July) but **increased significantly following the announcement of ECOWAS sanctions** (week of 31 July – 6 August).
- The highest increase was seen for **rice, which increased by a staggering 17% in one week**. Rice is Niger's single most important imported commodity by value and is mostly imported from Benin and Nigeria (which are both enforcing sanctions). India's announcement on July 20th of an export ban on rice likely also played an important role in the price increase.
- Anecdotal evidence suggests that prices have stabilized somewhat since August 6th, though this remains to be confirmed once official price data for the week of August 7-13th is available.


% change in weekly cereal prices (Niger national average), relative to the week preceding the political crisis (17- 23 July 2023)

Note: political crisis started 26 July, ECOWAS sanctions announced 30 July



Increase in rice prices following the sanctions, by region:

% increase between week of 7-23 July (before the political crisis and sanctions) and week of 31 July – 6 August




- Rice prices **increased significantly** in the week following the announcement of sanctions (31 July – 6 August), **especially in regions bordering Benin and Nigeria (where rice is usually imported from)**, i.e. Maradi, Zinder and Dosso
- Prices **stayed stable in rice producing regions** (Diffa and Tillabéri), which tend to rely more on local production

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF VARIOUS SCENARIOS (NB: SCENARIOS FOUND IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS)

- **Scenario 1 : Restoration of former government** : lifting of sanctions and return to normal
- **Scenario 2: Protracted Political Standoff and Extended Transition:** Continued sanctions
- **Scenario 3: Military conflict:** Lifting of sanctions but sharp deterioration of the humanitarian situation, with major population movements, market disruptions, inability of humanitarian organizations to access parts of the country

Impacts	Scenario 2: protracted political standoff (sanctions remain)	Scenario 3: military conflict (sanctions lifted)
Inflation and potential food shortages of certain imported products	X	X
Reduction of inflows of remittances from Nigériens abroad	X	
Loss of income or jobs in key sectors such as hospitality, cross-border trade, transport, domestic workers/ guards, foreign-owned companies	X	X
Public budget deficit, reducing government capacity for humanitarian assistance and job/ wage losses for civil servants	X	X
Major population displacements, requiring increased humanitarian assistance		X
Disruption to humanitarian food and nutrition assistance (inability to import food, limits on cash transfers)	X	

HISTORICAL DATA SUGGESTS THAT COUPS ACCELERATE FOOD PRICE INCREASE IN NIGER



- Millet prices in Niger tend to increase in the months following political coups (generally with a ~3 month time lag).
- Following the January 1996 coup, the average annual price of millet in 1996 increased by +43%, compared to 1995.

LEARNING FROM RECENT SANCTIONS ON MALI AND BURKINA FASO (2020 AND 2022)



- Unlike the current sanctions on Niger which cover all goods and services without exception, those imposed on Mali (2020 and 2022) and Burkina Faso (2022) excluded basic necessities such as food and medicine. This suggests that **impacts on food prices in Niger will be more severe than what was observed in Mali and Burkina Faso.**
- It's difficult to quantify precisely the impacts of recent ECOWAS sanctions on Mali and Burkina Faso on the economy and prices, as sanctions occurred at the same time as COVID, the Ukraine crisis and the global food crisis. Nevertheless, **data suggests that the sanctions contributed to increased inflation and food insecurity in both countries.**
 - In 2022, headline inflation was 10% in Mali and 14% in Burkina Faso; annual average maize prices increased by 41% in Mali and 48% in Burkina Faso (compared to the 5-year average).
 - **Food security conditions deteriorated significantly** in both countries between 2021 and 2022, with the number of severely food insecure people increasing by 38% in Mali and 21% in Burkina.
- In Mali, the economy showed signs of resilience despite the sanctions, with real GDP growing by 3.7% in 2022, up from 3.1% in 2021. Burkina Faso, on the other hand, experienced an economic slowdown - with real GDP growth dropping to 3.2% in 2022, down from 6.9% in 2021.
- The impact of sanctions did not lead to civil unrest in either country.

FOCUS ON MALI – IMPACT OF ECOWAS SANCTIONS IN 2020 AND 2022

2020

ECOWAS economic sanctions and border closures effective **Aug to Oct 2020 (basic necessities including all food products were exempt from sanctions)**


→ During this period food inflation increased from 5% to 7% and headline inflation increased from 2% to 4%. Inflation dropped significantly following lifting of sanctions.

2022

ECOWAS economic sanctions and border closures effective **Jan to July 2022 (basic necessities excluded)**

→ During this period food inflation increased from 11% to 17% and headline inflation increased from 9% to 12%. Food prices were 25% above 5 year average. Inflation dropped significantly following lifting of sanctions.


→ Other observed impacts: lower availability and higher prices of fertilizer, animal feed, construction material; reduced remittances




MALI

- Slight impact on exports and imports in the short term (especially in 2022), but quickly recovered.
- The country adapted in part by switching trade away from traditional partners (Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire) towards Mauritania and Guinea. However, the latter do not have the same port capacity/facilities and could not serve fully as substitutes.
- In 2022 Mali defaulted on more than \$300m of its debt, in part due to sanctions, which cut it off from the regional financial market and the regional central bank.

Exports (XOF Billion)




Government Budget Deficit (% of GDP)



TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | CENTRAL BANK OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (BCEAO)

Imports (XOF Billion)



LOOKING FORWARD...



KEY UNKNOWNNS

- Will there be a military intervention (which would significantly deteriorate the humanitarian situation, especially in terms of displacement and crop/livestock losses)?
- How long will sanctions last? How strongly will sanctions be enforced (especially by Nigeria and Benin – will informal trade continue)?
- Will ECOWAS quickly allow humanitarian carve outs to sanctions, which will be critical to ensure humanitarian needs are met?
- Will the de facto authorities impose price ceilings for key food products to contain inflation (which could lead to hoarding and shortages)?
- Will the de facto authorities give authorisations to regular international UNHAS flights and access to JetA1 fuel for domestic flights? To allow the efficient implementation of humanitarian programmes.
- Will the upcoming 2023 harvest be sufficient to cover the majority of the country's cereal needs, or will Niger need to import significant volumes (which will be extremely difficult if Nigeria and Benin maintain sanctions)?
- Will Niger be able to rapidly increase imports from Burkina Faso and Mali (who are not applying sanctions), to replace Nigeria and Benin ? And at what cost (more insecure routes, longer distances from ports)?
- Will main donors sustain their humanitarian and development support to Niger, and redirect or cancel their budget support funding streams?

FURTHER ANALYSIS

- This analysis will continue to be updated regularly as the situation evolves, including with updated price and food security data
- The next Cadre Harmonisé analysis is expected to go ahead as planned in November 2023. This will provide updated food insecurity figures, taking into account impacts of the political crisis and sanctions, and results of the 2023 harvest.



World Food Programme

SAVING
LIVES
CHANGING
LIVES

For more information: Research, Assessment and Monitoring (RAM) Unit:
WFP Niger: anna.law@wfp.org
WFP Regional Bureau for West Africa: ollo.sib@wfp.org